The more thorough the analysis one makes of a given object, the more profound is the unity which grasps its parts together; and the more elements one joins together by an act of synthesis, the more thoroughly it is differentiated into details.
Unity could not possibly be in the individual parts in isolation, but it must in some way be in each of the united parts and not merely in their sum.
Qualities will belong to the whole system and it will be the true individual. The relations which give individuality are seen to be common property and so merge their terms together instead of keeping them distinct. The whole which contains these parts and their relations now becomes the reality. The parts are mere relations and cease to exist in themselves and this leaves the relations as a system of adjectives.
In an organic being the whole meaning of the unity lies in its being differentiated into its particular set of organs, and the entire significance of each set of organs comes from their combination into that particular unity.
According to Hegel, the only unity which will be adequate to meet the requirement is “a unity which is not only in the individuals, but also for the individuals.” Now there is only one unity known to us in experience or conceivable by us in which the unity can be for the individuals which are its parts, and that is the system of conscious individuals.
If we take all reality, for the sake of convenience, as limited to three individuals, A, B, and C, and suppose them to be conscious, then the whole will be reproduced in each of them. A, for example, will, as conscious, be aware of himself, of B, and of C, and of the unity which joins them in a system. And thus the unity is within each individual. At the same time it is not in the individuals as isolated. For the whole point of saying that the unity is for A, is that it exists both out of him and in him. To recur to our example, the essence of consciousness is that the contents of consciousness purport to be a representation of something else than itself.
We know that the ultimate whole or reality must be differentiated into parts of a certain nature. We know of nothing in the entire cosmos which is possessed of the nature of these fundamental differentiations but ourselves and others, and we cannot think of anything else which has such nature but ourselves and others. This fact gives some probability to ourselves being some of those fundamental differentiations.
The pure ego apart from its content is a mere abstraction. Although the world of phenomena is divided into subjective and objective realms, both are equally within each self, the images of the subjective merely representing the things in the objective world. But while we cannot say of any reality that it is outside of us, neither can we say of any reality that it is only inside of us. In thinking about anything in the world a distinction is made between the knower and the object of knowledge. All but the pure ego can thus be separated from it and in that case of separation it is a mere abstraction, or nothing. As I know a thing more perfectly, I have it more completely within myself. But it can also be said that the more thoroughly I know an object the more distinctly contrasted with myself does it become.
It is inconceivable that the universality and necessity known to maintain in the world should be derived from mere sensations; they can only be thought of as due to the nature of the mind as it operates upon the matter of sense arising in it. Chaotic masses of sensation can never furnish the laws in experience; they must, therefore, be imposed upon experience by the mind. If the mind lacked this power, we could not realize the world of nature, even if sensations could arise in the mind. A multiplicity of impressions of sense, as certain sensations of color and smell and touch, could never without mind-activity be grasped and so arranged as to present as an external object with velvety petals and rich perfume. Much less could the vast and unitary world of experience exist if the mind did not impose its unity and regularity upon the totality of the elements of sense arising in it.
Any mind could not exist in relation to the world of experience except through its relationship to other minds.
The unity in the parts of the individual consciousness is a very profound one. Yet, it cannot render the mind self-sufficient, for the individual mind and its parts are always relative to something beyond themselves and is, therefore, dependent for its meaning and existence. In order that the mind may maintain a permanent existence it must be a member of the ultimate unity, and in order to do so, it must contain within itself the entire system of minds and yet permanently contrast itself with all other members. It must be at once federal and individual.
A mind is commonly viewed as a separate individual because an abstract or partial view of the person is necessary for our practical purposes. So natural is it to regard the mind as a thing inside a body that it becomes for thought very distinctly separated from other minds. But the fallacy of such a view has long been known. A view which would regard each person’s body as co-extensive with the objective world that includes within itself the bodies associated with all other minds would be a proper one and would be far more suggestive of the true connection between minds.
Such is the nature of the ultimate unity that the mutual or reciprocal recognition of its parts or members is necessary to the conscious existence and development of each.
From the nature of interacting minds a person becoming aware of himself and others “unconsciously” puts his objects forth in space relationships long before he can become reflectively conscious of the truths involved in the process he himself through a necessity of his being has put forth. In this “unconscious” way there originates the vast system of truths of which all men and especially the scientifically trained are striving to become reflectively conscious.
Each mind—through its own personal experience—is in organic connection with all of them and is, therefore, potentially conscious of the whole common world.
No matter how private feeling is thought to be, the feelings for the beautiful receive a kind of universality through their objectification into the common world, and thus the improvement of the aesthetic taste and the deepening and purifying of the feeling for the beautiful as people advance in civilization can be accounted for.
No one can exist who is not in relation to the common world.