Whereas a theory of an individual mind requires differentiation between one’s personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents.
Social identities can be affected by meta-cognitive representations of collective psychology, which emerge when the collective mind directs its attention toward its own mental states.
When collective mind is not only the origin of a representation, but also its represented target, we should expect strong increases in psychological closeness.
If the eyes are the windows to the soul, mutual gaze provides a shared view.
Failure to socially cohere in the face of a common threat can be more perilous to survival compared with failure to socially cohere in the face of joint victory.
Collective mind representations grant people increased confidence in knowing something together.
Whereas confidence in common knowledge increases cooperation when it is individually beneficial (e.g., in a Stag Hunt game), common knowledge of a shared psychology foregrounds the interests of the collective, increasing cooperation when it can be individually risky.
Successful communication exchanges, even as minimal as communicative eye contact, can create representations of collective metacognition that subsequently increase cooperative behavior and decision-making.
Recent theoretical and empirical research suggests that humans often represent a collective mind, both as the perspectival origin (collective reality) and its target (collective psychology).