Evan Thompson is an American-Canadian philosopher whose work explores one of the oldest puzzles in human thought: how the mind arises from living bodies. Blending philosophy, neuroscience, and Buddhist thought, Thompson is known for helping develop the field of embodied cognition, which argues that the mind isn’t just something that happens in the brain—it is something the whole living body does in constant dialogue with its world. He is a professor at the University of British Columbia, and has become one of the leading voices connecting Western philosophy with contemplative traditions.
The son of cultural historian William Irwin Thompson, Evan Thompson grew up around big ideas and interdisciplinary thinking, and he carried that spirit into his own work. His books—such as Mind in Life and Why I Am Not a Buddhist—wander cheerfully across borders between philosophy, biology, and meditation studies. If the old philosophical question was “What is mind?”, Thompson’s answer might be: look at life itself. Minds, in his view, are not ghostly software running on biological hardware; they are living processes, more like whirlpools in a river than machines in a lab.
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Date
June 20, 2004
Format
Lecture
Duration
42:01
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1
Date
2007
Format
Book
Host
lchc.ucsd.edu
Views
2
Evan Thompson argues that mind isn’t a ghost in the machine or just brain activity—it’s something living systems do. Drawing on biology and philosophy, he shows how life and mind grow together, like vines on the same trellis, suggesting that to understand thinking, we must first understand living.
Date
1991
Format
Book
Host
monoskop.org
This was one of the first books to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science, arguing for connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science—claims that have since become highly influential. Through cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, The Embodied Mind introduces a new form of cognitive science called “enaction,” in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book’s arguments are powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience.
Thomas Metzinger
Being No One
Thomas Metzinger argues that the self is an illusion—a virtual construct the brain generates to manage perception and action. When this self-model becomes transparent, we mistake it for reality and feel like “someone” inside our body. In truth, we’re self-simulating organisms, biological systems so advanced that we’ve come to believe our own virtual reflection is real.